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In this article preliminary design propositions are developed to organize and 
manage the fuzzy beginning of the Front End (FE) of New Product 
Development (NPD). These preliminary design propositions are based on 
the literature and on cross-case analyses of five case-studies. They include 
the proposition to organize the Fuzzy Front End (FFE) around the three 
basic processes option generation, option development and option screening 
and to use clearly distinct management regimes for the various processes of 
the FFE, the FE and of main stream NPD itself. 
 
 




Large, well-managed industrial companies typically use some kind of formal base-line management 
system (also called a stage-gate process, Cooper, 1990) to organise and manage their main stream 
New Product Development (NPD). Before a formal, main stream NPD-project is started, a first base 
line – or gate – is passed in which a well-detailed project brief is reviewed and authorised. This 
project brief includes issues like product functional specifications, business plan, the resources 
needed for development and product launch and the project plan. 
    Before this gate 1 one has the so-called Front End of the NPD-process (Rubenstein, 1994; 
Cooper, 1997: Khurana and Rosenthal, 1998). During this Front End process the above-mentioned 
project brief is prepared, so it includes product and project planning and various activities to prepare 
and support this product and project planning, like business and innovation strategy definition (see 
e.g. McGrath, 1995), platform or product family planning (see e.g. Robertson and Ulrich, 1998) and 
technology road mapping (see e.g. Barker and Smith, 1995; Groenveld, 1997). 
    The Front End also comprises idea generation, idea development and idea assessment. As 
opposed to the planning processes of the Front End, mentioned above, these processes tend to have 
a more fuzzy nature, often with no clear beginning, multiple inputs, no well-defined throughput-
process, creativity and serendipity playing crucial roles, participants getting involved and dropping 
out in unplanned ways, no clear interface with the planning part of the Front End, etc. This article 
deals with this fuzzy beginning of the Front End, the Fuzzy Front End (FFE). 
    This FFE is an important part of the overall NPD-process. As we will see, a sound FFE produces 
a variety of promising well-developed and well-tested options for products, product components or 
features and for product families or platforms as input for the subsequent product planning process 
(in the following these various types of options will just be called product options). By doing so the   2
FFE can strongly contribute to eventual product advantage and low product development costs and 
throughput times. 
    However, the nature of the FFE is still little understood and it is little researched in the context of 
the overall NPD-process. Nor is much known on effective management approaches to improve its 
performance. On the basis of the literature and on cross-case analyses of five case-studies we 
developed design propositions for organizing and managing this fuzzy beginning of the Front End 
of NPD, starting from the idea that the nature of the FFE is indeed very different from the nature of 
formal main stream NPD. These propositions are to be regarded as preliminary design propositions, 
as they have not yet been field-tested as such. 
 
 
2. THE FRONT END OF NPD AND ITS FUZZY BEGINNING 
 
The Front End of the New Product Development process comprises all activities preceding the start 
of  formal NPD-projects  (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Cooper, 1997; Khurana and Rosenthal, 
1998). These early activities have been dubbed the Fuzzy Front End of the NPD-process by Smith 
and Reinertsen (1991), a qualifier which has been adopted by several other authors (Moenaert et al., 
1995; Cooper, 1997; Khurana and Rosenthal, 1997; Rosenau, 1997; Koen et al., 2001; Buggie, 
2002; Kim and Wilemon, 2002). 
    Already a long time it is known that the Front End of NPD is an extremely important determinant 
of New Product success (Maidique and Zirger, 1984; see also Thomke and Fujimoto, 2000). Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt (1987) found that proficiency in pre-development activities and an early, clear 
product definition (‘protocol’) were two of the three most important success factors. And their study 
of determinants of timeliness (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1994) showed that ‘up-front homework’ 
was one of the three most important timesavers, while ‘product definition’ was one of the four other 
timeliness drivers (see also Cooper, 1997, on these issues). The results from Cooper and 
Kleinschmidts Canadian studies (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987) were supported by Song and 
Parry (1996), who found that for Japanese firms development process planning and concept 
development and evaluation were also strongly correlated with New Product success. 
    The deliverables of the Front End are defined by Khurana and Rosenthal (1997) as product 
concept, product definition and project plan and by Cooper (1997) as the business case, a somewhat 
broader concept, but which includes product definition and project plan. For Khurana and Rosenthal 
(1998, p. 59) the Front End includes product strategy formulation and communication, opportunity 
identification and assessment, idea generation, product definition, project planning and executive 
reviews. Cooper (1997) discusses the Front End in terms of his stage-gate model. It starts with an 
initial screen, followed by the preliminary investigation stage and after a second screen the detailed 
investigation stage, which includes building the business case. This second stage may involve in-
depth market analyses and also laboratory work to assess the technical aspects of the product idea. 
Roles in the Front End include core team, project leader, executive review committee, senior 
management (Khurana and Rosenthal, 1997 and 1998). Key success factors for the Front End 
include a clear link with strategy (McGrath, 1995), a strong market orientation (Cooper, 1997), a 
well-organised R&D-Marketing interface (Moenaert et al., 1995), the use of external sources of 
ideas and knowledge (Rubenstein, 1994) and, of course, proficiency in executing pre-development 
work (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995; Song and Parry, 1996). 
    The Front End literature seems to discuss two different categories of processes. On the one hand 
product and project planning, including the link with business and innovation strategy and building 
the business case, basically through desk work and interdisciplinary discussions. And on the other 
hand idea generation, idea development and idea assessment, which also involves desk work and 
discussions, but often laboratory and market research activities as well. In this article we are 
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primarily interested in this second category of processes. More so than the processes of the first 
category, these processes may have a fuzzy nature, as discussed in the previous section. In this 
article we will, therefore, restrict the term Fuzzy Front End (FFE) to this fuzzy beginning of the 
Front End of the NPD-process. The mission of this FFE, then, is to provide input in the form of 
promising product options to the final stage of the Front End, the product and project planning. 
Important input for incremental main stream NPD but even more so for radical NPD and for new 
business development. 
    There is some research on this beginning of the NPD process, like the work of Rubenstein (1994) 
and Christiansen (2000). Among other things Rubenstein discusses the various individual and 
organisational roles in this process, including the role of the corporate research labs of large 
companies, the role of intrapreneuring and the use of external sources of knowledge and of 
subcontracting of development activities during these stages. There is much research on idea 
generation in general and also some research on idea generation in the context of NPD (Baker, 
Green and Bean, 1985; Conway and McGuinness, 1986; Von Hippel, 1989; Christiansen, 2000). 
However, the FFE, as defined here, can still be regarded as under researched, especially in the 
context of the overall NPD-process, i.e. the FFE as feeder of main stream NPD. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH  STRATEGY 
 
This article is not, like most academic articles in Management, written on the basis of the paradigm 
of the explanatory sciences, like physics and sociology, but on the basis of the paradigm of the 
design sciences, like medicine and engineering. Following Van Aken (2004), the core mission of an 
explanatory science is to develop valid knowledge to describe, explain and predict. Research in an 
explanatory science can be seen as a quest for truth, for shared understanding of the objects of 
interest. The core mission of a design science, on the other hand, is to develop valid knowledge 
which can be used by the professionals in the field in question to design solutions to their field 
problems (hence the term “design science”). Research in a design science can be regarded as a quest 
for improving the human condition. The test of the knowledge of a design science is not truth but 
whether the solutions designed from it work, i.e. produce the intended results. 
    The typical product of an explanatory science is the causal model, explaining – preferably in 
quantitative terms – a phenomenon of interest in terms of some independent variables. The typical 
product of a design science is the technological rule (Bunge, 1967), connecting some intervention 
or construction with some outcome or performance (in a given application domain). More 
specifically, the logic of the technological rule is: if you want to achieve Y in situation Z, than do X 
(or something like X). The core of the rule is that X, a general solution concept. The rest of the rule 
is a kind of user instruction, connecting the solution concept with the field problem in question, 
including indications and contra-indications for its use. 
    A powerful category of the technological rule is the field-tested and grounded one. It is a rule that 
is tested in its intended field of application and it is known why, through what generative 
mechanisms, it produces its outcome. 
    The technological rule is general knowledge. Its application by a professional involves a 
translation from the general to the specific. The professional has to design a specific variant of the 
general solution concept, adapted to the specific conditions of his/her case. The evidence from field-
testing and the knowledge of the generating mechanisms behind the rule are essential input for this 
translation of the general to the specific. 
    The empirical basis for this article consists of five, very different, case-studies on the Fuzzy Front 
End of New Product Development. Case-studies were chosen as a research strategy to get an in-
depth understanding of the processes and problems in the FFE as well as to get an opportunity to 
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develop, in a kind of Action Research, approaches to deal with those problems. Each case-study 
was essentially a problem-solving project. These projects were subsequently used by the authors to 
develop general solution concepts through cross-case analyses of the problems encountered in the 
FFE and of the specific approaches developed to handle these problems. Through these cross-case 
analyses general solutions to management problems in the FFE are developed by “filtering out” the 
specifics of each case. So the cases were not used to derive true statements on how the FFE is, but 
to derive statements on how the FFE might be to produce intended results. No specific protocol was 
used for these cross-case analyses.  
     Technological rules can be regarded as design propositions, propositions with respect to the 
design of solutions to field problems. However, the results presented in this article should rather be 
regarded as preliminary design proposition, as they have not yet been sufficiently field-tested to be 
already called full design propositions. 
 
 
4. FIVE CASE-STUDIES IN FFE 
 
Every NPD-process has a Front End in which products and projects are defined, be it well organised 
or not. And every Front End is fed by product ideas, well developed and well tested or not. The 
ways in which those product ideas are generated, developed and assessed, however, varies greatly. 
We did five case-studies, among other things differing in industry and in company size, to get more 
insight in the nature of this, usually fuzzy, beginning of the Front End of NPD. 
    All cases are based on graduation projects of business engineering students of Eindhoven 
University of Technology, supervised by the authors. These projects have been executed in 
industrial companies (which we have given fictitious names) and were aimed at developing 
improvements of the FFE of the NPD-process of the company in question or of its NPD-process in 
general. In these projects, the students stayed six to eight months at the company, doing interviews, 
analyses, in cases C, D and E a survey, developing solutions for the problems specified in their 
assignments, and having many discussions with company staff (as well as with the university 
supervisors) on their analyses and proposed solutions. These projects gave the authors the 
opportunity to get in-depth insight in the subject matter through these students and through own 
contacts with company staff. The cases C, D and E started with an audit of the overall NPD-process, 
permitting us to put the FFE into the perspective of this overall NPD-process. Four cases concerned 
both incremental and radical NPD and one concerned new business development. 
    We will give a brief description of these cases, to provide the background for the subsequent 
discussion of FFE-problems and FFE-solution concepts. 
 
Case A  World Devices 
World Devices is a large multinational company in the field of consumer devices. It has a well-
organised NPD-process, the company’s business strategy being strongly based on creating product 
advantage. Recently the company had put much effort into a large, company-wide improvement 
project to bring down development throughput times. The core of this project consisted in defining 
a norm-process, in which all the company’s know-how on development management was 
incorporated, and in subsequently implementing this process company-wide (while allowing for 
some local variations). Subsequently one wanted to improve the FFE, as there were still some 
problems, including 
-  a short term orientation of mainstream development, resulting in too little product advantage 
-  insufficient marketing inputs to idea development 
-  underdeveloped screening; some ideas were incorporated in product planning but not 
sufficiently tested, while some other good ideas were not used for unclear reasons. 
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Case B    Global Materials 
    The strategy of Global Materials, a large division of a large multinational company in the 
business of plastics , was to move away form low-margin bulk materials and to increase its sales in 
high-margin specialties. It had developed a revolutionary new material, which it sold in increasing 
quantities to manufacturers of end-products. It was now looking for new applications of this 
material , which each time involved some adaptation of its properties in order to create new 
business. This search was driven by a market development department, usually in projects with 
close collaboration with a manufacturer of end-products. The various application development 
projects were executed by cross-functional teams. The key problem now was a perceived under 
performance of this market development department, which – being a part of the sales division – 
was managed as if it where a sales department and judged on the basis of tons of materials sold in 
initial sales of their new products. On the other hand, under the pressure of very challenging growth 
targets for the company as a whole, large amounts of money were invested in high-risk 
development projects, many of which eventually failed. 
 
Case C  Complex Mechanical Systems 
    Complex Mechanical Systems (CMS) is a mid-sized, well-established Dutch company, supplying 
complex mechanical systems in the field of warehousing and logistics to clients all over the world. 
Their systems consist of own modules, combined with many purchased components,  usually to be 
assembled on-site. The competitive strategy of CMS is firmly based on product advantage, while 
keeping prices reasonable. CMS has a fairly large central R&D-department (some 50 people), 
working for the three businesses of the company. Innovation is partly project-bound, R&D-
developing adaptations of existing modules to meet the specifications of a given ordered system, 
and partly general, aimed at developing new generations of CMS’s own modules. Some 15 % of 
R&D-capacity is spent on ‘research projects’, i.e. pre-development (idea generation, idea 
development, often up to prototyping). Problems of CMS include cost problems (product advantage 
is not always a key order winning criterion), too little really new ideas (efforts to realize product 
advantage are too much based on the successes of a few years ago) and too little focus, partly 
because the link with strategy is unclear. 
 
Case D  International Imaging Systems 
    International Imaging Systems (IIS) is a small company in specialty TV-camera’s (employing 
some 50 people), but on the world market a leader in its niche. Its R&D-resources are very limited, 
but by focussing on a few core competences it arrives at developing technologically cutting-edge 
products. Its customers are mostly big, sophisticated OEMs. Its product ideas are to a large extent 
generated by these customers – who may even pay for the innovation effort – or by their innovative 
suppliers of key components. The problems of IIS are its limited competences and resources: they 
have to be very selective in the development projects they start, but at the same time they have to 
fulfil the needs of their demanding customers and to stay being a market leader. 
 
Case E   WearStop 
    WearStop is a young micro company (10 people) in the business of overhauling engines of cross- 
and race motorcycles. They do so by mechanically repairing the engine-cylinders and subsequently 
coating the inner surface with a very hard layer through a sophisticated electrolytic process. Process 
development is done by one man with a small laboratory. During the first years it was aimed at 
getting the electrolytic process under control. Now it is aimed at broadening the product range of 
the company, in line with the company’s strategy to diversify. New products include friction plates, 
coated through their special process. One of the strengths of the company is its application know-
how of the motor world. Product ideas – or ideas on product enhancements – come from intense 
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contacts with motorcycle drivers. The problems are, of course, the limited competence base and the 
very limited resources. 
 
 
5.  PROBLEMS IN THE FFE 
 
The cross-case analysis of the five cases, described above, created a general picture of the FFE and 
of the problems of organising and managing it. These problems include the following. 
-  Pressures on the performance of the overall NPD-process can lead to a short term orientation for 
the FFE, extrapolation rather than real exploration, and lack of risk-taking (case A and C). 
-  The participation of the key stakeholders in NPD is not well-organised, leading to a strong 
internal orientation, under developed communication – both with internal and external parties – 
and in a technology-driven company to too little marketing input into the FFE (cases A and C), 
or, on the other hand, difficulties of getting commitment by certain departments for uncertain 
projects (in case B the R&D-department was reluctant to spend its scarce resources on market 
development projects with low credibility). 
-  Idea generation as such was not so much of a problem in the large companies of case A and B, 
which had strong R&D-traditions: NPD in these companies seemed to operate in idea-rich 
environments. However, it was a serious issue for the smaller companies, the cases C, D and E. 
-  Underdeveloped screening and haphazard selection of ideas for product planning, which may 
lead to an incorporation of underdeveloped ideas in product planning (case A, E and to some 
extent D) and may lead to continuing investing much money in low-potential projects (case B). 
-  Underdeveloped resource control: for many projects in case B the huge costs became only clear 
after they failed; in case A there was an implicit norm for the total amount of resources to be 
spent on the FFE, but the allocation of those resources to the various ideas was largely left to 
intrapreneuring. 
-  Difficulties in performance control: in case B the company’s traditional outcome control was 
used, but in view of the large uncertainties and long time horizons this was dysfunctional; this 
problem surfaced because a specific department had been made responsible for the FFE; in the 
four other cases this problem remained under the surface, because the responsibility for the 
outcome of the FFE was much more distributed. 
-  And, finally, maybe the most important issue is the managerial ‘invisibility’ of the FFE-process. 
Again in case B this was less so, but the informal nature of the FFE and the distributed 
responsibilities for the performance of the FFE in the four other cases made that the process of 
idea generation and development as such, the resources to be spent on it and the expectations on 
its outcomes were seldom discussed explicitly. 
 
 
6. DESCRIBING THE FRONT END OF NPD  
 
In describing the FFE we will use the concept of the development funnel (Hayes, Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1988; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), see fig 1, because it aptly describes the process of 
going from a large number of immature ideas towards a limited number of promising product 
options, to be used in main stream NPD. The Front End (FE) is the mouth of the funnel,  where new 
ideas enter or are created, which through a certain culling process are screened, developed – both 
with respect to technical and marketing aspects – and further screened, until one arrives at a more 
limited number of – preferably well-developed and promising – ideas, which are then the input to 
the product and project planning at the neck of the funnel. Product and project planning result – 
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                        Figure 1  The Fuzzy Front End of main stream NPD  (adapted from Wheelwright  
                                        and Clark, 1992). Here the FFE is seen as the beginning of the Front 
                                        End, which ends with the preparation of the project brief 
 
 
among other things -  in the project brief, discussed in the introduction. This project brief then is 
reviewed and authorized at gate 1, the entrance of the formal main stream NPD-process. 
     In line with the literature and our cases we see as the mission of the FFE to feed product and 
project planning of main stream NPD with a satisfactory number of promising product options at an 
acceptable price and within a competitive time span. This means that the mission of the FFE is not 
to develop product specifications and even less so prototypes, but to provide product and project 
planning with a satisfactory number of promising and well-developed options, some of which will 
be ‘called’ by these planning activities. Resource and performance control of the FFE can use real 
options reasoning (Mitchel,1990: Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Lint and Pennings, 1998, McGrath, 
1999). According to this reasoning one ‘buys’ with a relatively limited investment in resources 
options on future products, options which may be exercised by formal NPD-projects beyond the 
neck of the development funnel. The creation of options is a high-risk activity. Its performance 
should, therefore, not be assessed on the basis of an individual option, but at the level of the 
portfolio of options. ‘The key issue is not avoiding failure, but managing the cost of failure by 
limiting exposure to the downside while preserving access to attractive opportunities’ (McGrath, 
1999, p. 16). 
     The development funnel of fig 1 describes essentially a NPD process driven as – in terms of 
Chesbrough (2003) – closed innovation, i.e. innovation within the scope of a single company. The 
FFE of an open or networked innovation process, in which inter-company collaboration plays a 
major role in various stages of the innovation process, is also very interesting, but that process falls 
outside the scope of the present article. 
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6.  ORGANIZING THE FRONT END OF NPD AND ITS FUZZY BEGINNING 
 
In the following we will present a number of preliminary design propositions to organize and 
manage the FFE in the context of the overall NPD process. These propositions are based on the 
problems and solutions of the five cases. In section 8 we will give some justification of them. This 
may be seen as a preliminary way of grounding these propositions. 
     In organizing the Front End of NPD the first proposition is to make a clear distinction in 
organization and management between  
-  main stream NPD, with few (relatively) low risk, resource-intensive projects 
-  the high risk, ‘light’ option-development projects during the fuzzy beginning of the Front  
End – the FFE -  and 
-  the more rational processes of product and project planning in the final stage of the Front End.  
The FFE itself should be organized around  the three core operational processes of option 
generation, using multiple inputs from both external and internal sources, option screening and 
option-development, both with respect to technical aspects – possibly involving laboratory work – 
and with respect to marketing aspects, possibly involving some market research. The core 
management process in the FFE is option portfolio management, deciding on the amount of 
resources to be spent on the FFE and on the allocation of these resources to the development of the 
various options in the portfolio, among other things on the basis of the results from option-
screening. 
     As said, the mission of the FFE is to provide a satisfactory number of promising product options 
to the product and project planning of main stream NPD. Its performance should not be judged on 
the average success-rate of options (a high success-rate might mean a risk-avoidance portfolio-
management and hence too little real innovation), but on the results from those few options that are 
actually called. And a second performance indicator of options-portfolio management is its 
efficiency: as said, one should not spend too much resources on option-development.  
    Organising any process means in principle defining that process in terms of sub processes with 
their input and output relations and defining the roles of individuals and groups (on departments) in 
each of those (sub)processes. Given the uncertain nature of the FFE those process definitions may 
be fairly fuzzy and limited, even in a well-organised FFE. However, one can do much with role 
definitions, both in terms of content and contribution (like person or department x is responsible for 
inputs from the domain y) and in terms of type of actions: gate keeper, product champion, devils 
advocate, option-sponsor, review-board, etc. In repetitive, low-uncertainty processes there usually is 
much  potential for improvement by separating planning and execution. In fuzzy processes this 
potential is much lower; instead one should put more effort in role definitions, leaving the actual 
scheduling of activities to the individuals and groups assigned to these roles themselves.  
     It is the responsibility of NPD-management to have an effective Front End of NPD in place to 
feed the resource-intensive main stream NPD with sound project briefs and to allocate sufficient 
resources to it, both for the planning activities for product and project planning and for the technical 
and market research activities for developing and testing options. 
         
 
8.   MANAGING THE FFE: OPERATING ON THE EDGE OF CHAOS  
 
The very idea of organising and managing the FFE is alien to some. Ideas are emergent and their 
generation cannot be forced. On the other hand one may want to improve the performance of the 
FFE by solving some of the organisational problems discussed section 5, like the uneven 
participation of individuals and departments in the FFE and the problems of resource control and 
allocation. Some authors, therefore, propose to extend the stage-gate process of the formal, main 
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stream NPD-process to the FFE (Cooper, 1997; Cohen, Kamienski and Espino, 1998). However, we 
feel that such an approach does not match the nature of the FFE. Just like in former days children 
were mistakenly treated as being just small adults (and clothed as such), instead of treating them as 
being really different from adults in many important aspects, we feel that FFE-activities should not 
be treated as normal NPD-projects with just some more uncertainty. Organising and managing the 
FFE faces a real dilemma. In the FFE one has much risk and uncertainty, the desired results are ill 
defined and the roads to those results even less. Therefore, in organising the FFE one has to strike 
the right balance between free exploration and business-direction. Too much direction kills 
exploration, creativity and serendipity, while too little direction hurts FFE-performance. This 
dilemma has been called the Daphne-dilemma by Van Aken and Weggeman (see box 1). 
 
In the Greek Daphne-myth, the sun god Apollo is enamoured of the beautiful young maiden 
Daphne. However, she is terrified of his advances and flees. Apollo uses various circumspect 
approaches, but she remains evasive. Eventually he has almost catched her, but then she turns 
into a Laurel-tree. 
This myth symbolises the morning dew, admired by the upcoming sun but disappearing for its 
loving rays. 
The Daphne-dilemma has to do with the problems of approaching an elusive phenomenon like 
literary inspiration or the recollection of a dream: one tries to catch it, but too much intent 
destroys it. 
 
Box 1 The Daphne-dilemma (Van Aken and Weggeman, 2000)  
 
One approach to handle this dilemma has been given by Quinn (1985). He describes managing 
product innovation as controlling chaos. This implies that chaos is not suppressed but is ‘just’ 
controlled, as many innovations don’t travel along predefined paths but follow fairly chaotic 
processes with feed back and feed forward loops, circumvention of thorny obstacles, unanticipated 
breakthroughs, etc. In our opinion this approach does no longer apply to main stream  NPD in large, 
well-managed industrial companies, and certainly not to incremental main stream NPD (where 
usually the bulk of the NPD-resources is spent). But it does apply to the FFE. Controlling chaos 
means in our opinion operating on the edge of chaos, i.e. on the ‘dissipative equilibrium’ between 
the chaos-trap on the one hand and the bureaucracy-trap on the other (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998). 
It is a dissipative equilibrium, because it costs energy to maintain it (as opposed to a stable one - 
like a marble in a hollow - which doesn’t cost energy to maintain). In the bureaucracy trap one has 
well-defined targets, processes and division of labour, good for exploitation but bad for exploration, 
particular in uncertain situations (or situations far-from-equilibrium-and-agreement). In the chaos-
trap one has on the other hand ill-defined processes and division of labour, which can ultimately 
lead to an ‘error-catastrophe’: one is continually repairing errors so that the normal, undisturbed 
processes drown in repair actions and fire-fighting, causing the necessary organisational learning 
and improvement processes to disappear, eventually leading to a total break-down. Too much 
structure kills uncertain, but possibly high-potential initiatives, too little will yield unsatisfactory 
results. 
    Analysing our cases, we see that Global Materials, case B, was in fact the only case in which the 
company really wanted to organise and manage its FFE, i.e. its idea generation and especially its 
idea development. They did set up a special department to drive idea development and used the 
company’s traditional outcome control to manage it. They ended up in managing it too tightly, 
which at the same time did not prevent the waste of resources on low-potential ideas. World 
Devices, case A, on the other hand managed their FFE too loosely. The company had a tradition of 
spending quite some resources on free exploration, but in the end they concluded that their 
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management approach led to an underperformance of their FFE. In the cases C, D and E the 
companies were just getting aware of the possible importance of the FFE. For International Imaging 
Systems (case D), however, it was still not a key issue, as they got sufficiently well-developed ideas 
from their powerful and sophisticated customers and suppliers. For the micro company WearStop 
the key issue was to get more control of their NPD as a whole; improving their FFE was compared 
to that of less importance. But for Complex Mechanical Systems, with a NPD-process operating in 
a less idea-rich environment than the multinationals A and B, improving the performance of their 
FFE was indeed becoming an issue. 
    Organising and managing the FFE does not mean that one should use the formal management 
systems of the stage-gate process in the FFE, but much more loose structures. In discussing and 
designing such management systems it is worthwhile to distinguish type 1, type 2 and type 3 
management regimes (Van Aken and Weggeman, 2000). With the type 1 management regime we 
mean the formal stage-gate management processes of main stream NPD.. Here we have business 
plans, project plans, milestones, formal agreements on resources and especially dead lines to be 
met. 
    With the type 3 management regime - on the other hand - we mean the management of 
undirected research. In large corporate R&D-establishments typically some 10 to 15% of total 
resources is spent on such undirected research (sometimes called ‘Friday-afternoon-research’). The 
activities of gate-keepers and boundary-spanning individuals usually are managed under a type 3 
management regime. Here we have definitions of roles, of communication patterns and of roughly 
the resources to be spent, but very little direction of the content of the research and very few targets 
and milestones.  
    The type 2 management regime, finally, is a hybrid between type 1 and type 3: not as formal as 
type 1 and not as free as type 3. The typical type 2 project is the seed money project, applied for by 
scientists and engineers who have a good product- on technology idea and now need some 
resources to develop that idea further. If one wants to organise the FFE as a stage-gate process, one 
may want to use Cooper’s ideas of flexible gates and fluid stages (Cooper, 1994), which may be too 
dangerous to use in a type 1 management regime, but appropriate in a type 2 management regime. 
Under a type 2 management regime one does not have the formal resource allocation procedures of 
the type 1 regime, but some very light procedure, involving only management-levels close to the 
innovation operations. However, one does have some idea on content and on potential interest for 
the business. The core idea behind type 2 resource allocation is that those resources should in 
principle be very limited. As said, it is easy to spend too much on low-potential options, so the type 
2 management regime should have sufficient control on spending resources. 
     Option-generation should largely be managed under regime 3, with an emphasis on injection of 
variety, among other things through openness to the environment (using e.g. gatekeepers) and 
through (informal) collaboration with suppliers, lead customers (if any) and other potential partners. 
Intensive internal communication is essential. 
     On the other hand, option-development and option-screening should be managed under regime 
2, with option-portfolio management as core management process. Typically option-development 
will cost more resources than option-generation, but the task of option-portfolio management is to 
limit spending. As said above: manage the cost of failure by limiting exposure to the downside 
while preserving access to attractive opportunities. By limiting spending one can take more risks in 
option-development than would be acceptable in resource-intensive main stream NPD 
     Option-development can use Boersma’s (1994) approach of focusing on potential bottlenecks, 
not on prototypes (this is a kind of Theory-Of-Constraints for NPD). As opposed to option-
generation and development, option-screening can be organised fairly crisp and clear and it can use 
an array of analytical checklists and techniques. One should organise it as a group process in which 
all major internal stakeholders are represented and with some injection of additional variety by 
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outsiders. Competition between ‘option-champions’ and ‘devil’s advocates’ (to avoid the trap of 
group think) may help and the participants should be close enough to the actual innovation activities 
to have a real understanding of the issues at hand.  
 
 
9.     JUSTIFICATION 
 
The sections 7 and 8 gave some solution concepts for organizing and managing the FFE in the 
context of NPD. These solution concepts are based on the problems found in our five cases and on 
the approaches which have been designed to deal with them. They are proposed to handle the 
problems, discussed in section 5 in order to improve the performance of the FFE. In line with the 
mission of the FFE, given in section 6, this performance can be judged on the traditional criteria of 
the timeliness, costs and quality of the product options it has produced. The main idea of the 
sections 7 and 8 is to really organize and manage the FFE – and in doing so to make it ‘visible’ for 
management – without overdoing it, the management regime 2 idea. This is based on 
-  case C and D, which had a fairly good product and project planning process in place, but left the 
product option generation largely to chance resulting in a too low number of promising product 
options 
-  case A in which the FFE was under organized, resulting in a fairly haphazard option-
development 
-  case B, the only one that really wanted to organize and manage the FFE, but used for this an 
inappropriate regime 1, paradoxically resulting in huge overspending. 
A further proposition is to use real options reasoning in managing the FFE: limited investments in a 
relatively large number of high-risk product options. In case A there was a too short time horizon 
and a lack of risk taking, resulting in too little really innovative product options. And on the other 
hand in case B the risks were underestimated; on the basis of a regime 1 management philosophy 
the high failure-rate was attributed to poor management, rather than to the inevitable result of a 
high-risk project portfolio. 
 
 
10.   CONCLUSION 
 
This research project was aimed at developing more understanding of the nature of the FFE and of 
its problems as well as at developing general solution concepts for dealing with these problems in 
order to improve the performance of the FFE. 
    We did so on the basis of the idea that the nature of the FFE is really different from mainstream, 
formal New Product Development. We introduced the idea of a type 2 management regime, to label 
approaches that try to strike a balance between free and undirected exploration of new ideas on the 
one hand (the type 3 management regime) and the formal, tightly managed main stream 
development (the type 1 management regime). Through a well-developed type 2 management 
regime one may adequately deal with the Daphne-dilemma. As said, these solution concepts are as 
yet to be regarded as preliminary design propositions, as they have to be further field-tested and 
refined.  
    Christiansen (2000) discusses how industries vary with respect to product ideas along the 
dimensions many/few, respectively expensive/inexpensive relative to corporate resources to 
develop, thus creating four types of industries. Our position is that one should not treat this aspect 
of  corporate situation as being fully given, but that one should try to create as much as possible a 
many/inexpensive situation by establishing a productive FFE. 
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